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1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
2	EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA		
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5	IN RE: CHINESE MANUFACTURED DRYWALL PRODUCTS	*	
6	LIABILITY LITIGATION	* September 19, 2011 *	
7	This Document Relates to All	Cases * 9:00 a.m.	
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10	ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE HONORABLE ELDON E. FALLON		
11		ES DISTRICT JUDGE	
12			
13	APPEARANCES:		
14	For the Plaintiffs:	Herman Herman Katz & Cotlar	
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PROCEEDINGS 1 (September 19, 2011) 2 3 THE DEPUTY CLERK: All rise. THE COURT: Be seated, please. Good afternoon, 4 5 ladies and gentlemen. We have a number of people on the phone, 6 so please use the microphones when you do speak. 7 Let's call the case, please. 8 THE DEPUTY CLERK: We have MDL 2047, Chinese 9 Manufactured Drywall Products Liability Litigation. 10 **THE COURT:** Counsel present make their appearance for the record, please. 11 12 MR. FERACHI: Your Honor, Michael Ferachi on behalf 13 of JPMorgan Chase & Co. 14 MR. DAVIS: Good morning, Your Honor. Leonard Davis on behalf of the plaintiffs' steering committee. 15 16 MR. LEVIN: Arnold Levin, sir. 17 THE COURT: Anyone else on the phone for the defendants? 18 19 MS. BASS: Hilarie Bass, Your Honor, on behalf of the home builders association. 20 21 MR. COE: Your Honor, Ward Coe for T. Rowe Price 22 Group. 23 MR. HARDT: Your Honor, on the phone, this is Ken 24 Hardt in the Germano action. 25 MR. MCCAHILL: Mike McCahill for defendant IBSA.

McCahill is M-C-C-A-H-I-L-L.

THE COURT: Counsel, before we are over, may want to meet with the court reporter and make sure that we have the names of the people that they represent.

By way of background, we are dealing with discovery motions here that basically involve to a great extent the issues of jurisdiction. The plaintiffs' committee has filed a 30(b)(6) and also a subpoena duces tecum of officials of JPMorgan and T. Rowe Price calling upon them to appear and produce documents that were generated by subsidiaries or companies that the plaintiffs' committee feels are subsidiaries under the control of T. Rowe Price and JPMorgan.

The defendants resist, indicating that they had no control over these subsidiaries, they're independent corporations, and they don't have the requisite control and/or ownership and should not be required to produce this material. The plaintiffs filed a motion to compel the material, and JPMorgan and T. Rowe Price have filed a motion to quash the subpoenas.

There are two groups of complaints. One is procedural and the other is substantive. As I understand, the procedural arguments are recognized by the plaintiffs largely and they feel that those procedural matters can be resolved, but the substantive or significant issues need to be discussed with the Court. Let me hear from the moving parties.

MR. DAVIS: Good afternoon, Your Honor. This is Leonard Davis. Your Honor, I might just for our record clear up just a few items. Specifically with respect to what you call the procedural issues, those being the alleged failure to deposit a witness fee or failing to issue a subpoena in the proper venue, those types of issues, I have spoken with counsel for JPMorgan Chase. In fact, we have met in person once or twice, but we have spoken. I've also spoken by phone with counsel for T. Rowe Price, who's on the phone.

We have discussed those, as they have been called, procedural issues, and Your Honor is right on target and correct in that the plaintiffs' steering committee is happy to clear up any of those issues with respect to procedural deficiencies if, in fact, Your Honor, believes that going forward on what really is the substantive issue here as we have narrowed it down, that is, the care/custody/control issue goes forward. So that issue I believe is not an issue for today.

MR. FERACHI: I'll be happy to address that more, Your Honor, in my portion.

THE COURT: Sure. By and large, I agree with what you say for the procedure. There's no question that there's a 100-mile rule, and there's no question that you need to deposit certain money and the Court should issue it. The rules are what they are, and I'm not going to alter them.

MR. DAVIS: Your Honor, there are a couple motions

and they are really intertwined into one argument. Just so our record is clear, there was a motion to compel that was filed as to JPMorgan Chase & Co. There was also a motion to compel as to T. Rowe Price. Both of those entities also filed motions to quash subpoenas, so they're all intertwined together into one argument.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. DAVIS: In an attempt to really hone in on the issue and not waste time, quite frankly, Your Honor, the plaintiffs' steering committee filed various memoranda that apply to both of those motions. Specifically, Your Honor ordered that briefing be filed on September 6. Those briefs that were filed in connection with the T. Rowe Price matter and the JPMorgan Chase matter are where I will really hone in on because it does address the issue that Your Honor asked about: possession, custody, control, those types of issues.

I don't believe that there's any dispute that a subpoena was issued to JPMorgan Chase back in May, approximately May 25, and to T. Rowe Price on July 22. Those subpoenas -- and I will really sum it up -- seek to obtain documents as well as the deposition of the individual entities. They seek to obtain documents of drywall problems, communications with Taishan, communications with BNBM, communications with foreign government regarding problem drywall, ownership interest in

Chinese manufacturers, and loans to Chinese manufacturers.

These items really aren't foreign in this litigation and, in fact, Your Honor I know is very familiar with that as a result of the briefing and the recent order and reasons that were issued with respect to Taishan, which is Document 10269. In fact, some of those items are very familiar to the parties.

The question that Your Honor asked to be briefed was whether Rule 45 ties into Rule 33. Our briefing and I think the briefing of all parties really sets that out. I don't think it's disputed that a Rule 45 subpoena to a third party is governed by the regular rules of discovery. I don't think anybody really disputes that. The real issue, as I begin, is are the documents in T. Rowe Price's or JPMorgan Chase's possession, custody, or control.

JPMorgan and its subsidiaries we believe should have those documents. As we have attached and as is very apparent, in the 2010 report of China National Building Company, Ltd., we know that JPMorgan Chase & Co. is identified as having H shares, and I'm looking at page 51 of that report. JPMorgan Chase is identified as having what appears to be at least 17 percent of the total shares of capital in CNBM, and T. Rowe Price is at least 3.83 percent. That's similar to the documents that are also referenced in the 2009 interim report where JPMorgan Chase is identified as having roughly 17,

18 percent ownership interest.

That's really the basis for the issuance of the subpoena because, as we understand it, H shares of stock, which are stock issued in Hong Kong or China for investors, relates to ownership. Now, we understand that JP -- and I'll use JPMorgan Chase as the example. JPMorgan Chase believes or says, "It's really not me. I'm the holding company. It's a subsidiary."

Well, Your Honor, there's no way for us to get to a subsidiary and not to do that in an efficient way, and so what we did was issue the subpoenas to the parent company. Our position is that the parent is the parent is the parent and it controls the children and the grandchildren. Our briefing really sets this out.

For instance, we know JPMorgan is a financial holding company. It's a national bank. It's in 23 states in the United States with branches. It issues credit cards through a national bank. It operates overseas. It's a big company. They issue a shareholder report. When they report to their shareholders, they talk about everything, including the children and the grandchildren. It's a big company.

Our position is that service on JPMorgan here in the United States ought to be sufficient because it is in control of all of its children and grandchildren. Otherwise, as a practical matter, we would be spending hours and hours and

hours -- and dollars and dollars and dollars -- of the Court's time, our time, and everyone else's time to go issue subpoenas which maybe we couldn't even serve or get responses to.

The idea of the MDL is to promote efficiency, and we know that this Court has asked counsel to be efficient and promote efficiency. So service upon the parent who has control according to its own 10K and according to its own stockholders report or annual report -- and it gives that information to all its stockholders that it does control and it issues consolidated financial statements and the like -- ought to be sufficient.

Now, we have not had an opportunity to go depose JPMorgan Chase. We have met and conferred about that issue. I am happy to go take those depositions. But as I've said to Counsel, as a practical matter, the real issue ought to be are there documents, do they exist, and then let's go address that issue. Let's not waste time is the practical approach that we have looked at.

We are told or are under the belief that documents exist in some entity. I don't know what entity. We have not gotten that information. So I throw that issue out so that the Court is well aware of that. I don't think I need to go into the briefing and the Bank of America case that I cited. I know the Court is very familiar with the briefing and what the law is. I'm happy to do that if the Court wants me to with

respect to JPMorgan Chase.

THE COURT: No.

MR. DAVIS: With respect to T. Rowe Price, they admit in their annual report that it operates worldwide, and it admits that it has a Hong Kong branch. It's a very similar argument, Your Honor. It's a financial holding company. I can go into more if the Court wants me to, but I really think the issue is very clear to all parties.

THE COURT: Let me hear from the defendant. You speak for --

MR. FERACHI: JPMorgan Chase & Co., Your Honor. My name is Michael Ferachi.

I do want to address briefly the procedural defect, Your Honor. On page 2 of the PSC's brief, the PSC asserts that JPMorgan Chase is trying to hide behind the procedural defect and not get to the heart of the matter, which is control. Your Honor, if that were the case, we wouldn't be here before you today. We would have really just said when we were before you two weeks ago, "Please quash the subpoena because they didn't follow the rules." But because we agree with the PSC about judicial efficiency, that's why the control issue is here before you.

There are really just kind of three points that I want to hit. One is that JPMorgan Chase & Co., who they refer to as Chase & Co., is a financial holding company that

does not have control of the documents. Two, just because it has subsidiaries that it has 100 percent control over because it owns them doesn't mean it controls their documents. Three, Your Honor, there's a practical solution that will allow this Court and the PSC to issue those subpoenas without ignoring the corporate formalities that Chase & Co. has established.

Before I get into those three points, I want to talk a little about the factual background. As I mentioned, Chase & Co. is a financial holding company. It has thousands of subsidiaries. Some of those subsidiaries at one time or another have held an interest in China National Building Material (CNBM) and have provided that information to the PSC.

What the PSC said a moment ago talked in terms of grandchildren and children. Your Honor, CNBM is not the grandchild of Chase & Co. Chase & Co. has thousands of children, but those children who have held an interest in CNBM did so just like they might hold an interest in Walmart stock or in Sears or ExxonMobil. It is an investment. They don't own the company. They have invested in it.

Counsel also mentioned that the PSC was told that somebody has documents. That wasn't us, Your Honor. We haven't talked to the PSC about documents because, as counsel for Chase & Co., I have no idea if the subsidiaries do have documents that would be relevant to the inquiry. I'm here only on behalf of Chase & Co., the ultimate parent, on the control

issue.

Now, it's important that we follow the corporate formalities, and the PSC wants us to ignore that. The PSC would like to be able to serve any parent of any company and require that parent to produce the documents of the subsidiaries. They are really only focused on one issue and that is corporate ownership, so we will discuss that, Your Honor.

One thing the PSC did not say was anything about the burden of proof. The PSC has the burden of proof to establish that Chase & Co. has control over the requested documents. It hasn't established that and it can't meet that for a very important reason.

Judge, we recognize the definition of *control* is very broad, but there are limitations. In fact, the courts have really looked at the nature of the relationship between the parent and the subsidiary to determine if or not there's control. The most recent case that comes from the Fifth Circuit jurisdiction is the *Shell Global Solutions* case which I cited for you in our brief. It was decided just last month by the Southern District of Texas.

It really looked at a number of factors to determine whether or not there was control. The first one is commonality of ownership. The second one is exchange or intermingling of directors, officers, employees of the parent

and subsidiary. Third is the exchange of documents between the corporation and the parent in the ordinary course of business. Fourth, is there any benefit or involvement of the corporation in the transaction which is the subject of the litigation and dispute and any involvement of the parent in the litigation.

At least two other courts, Your Honor, have applied similar factors. That was the *In Re: Ingeteam* case which was decided just last month as well as the *In Re: Huawei Technologies* case.

What's important, Your Honor, I believe to recognize is that the commonality of ownership is only one of many factors. The PSC has only referred to commonality of ownership as the sole factor. I think their position can be summed up by a simple argument: If the parent owns 100 percent of the subsidiary, then it controls the subsidiary and must produce those documents.

Well, if that were the case, Your Honor, we really wouldn't be here before you today. It would be open and shut. There wouldn't be any jurisprudence around the country on this issue because in any situation like we have here where Chase & Co. owns 100 percent of some of these subsidiaries, we wouldn't be able to argue that they're still not in control. So it's clear that commonality of ownership is only one of those tests.

The PSC has not tried to deal with any of the

other issues that we raised in our affidavits about the other factors. For instance, Your Honor, we submitted an affidavit of Christine Bannerman which establishes that there is no sharing of employees between Chase & Co. and its subsidiaries. The affidavit also establishes that there is no sharing of documents in the ordinary course of business between Chase & Co. and its subsidiaries.

Well, Your Honor, if there is no sharing of documents and employees, it's hard to imagine how there is an interconnectedness between the parent and the subsidiary that meets the tests that have been established by the courts. In fact, both *Shell Global Solutions* and *Huawei Technologies* really rely on the sharing of employees and sharing of documents in the order and course.

In the *BMW* case which we cited to you as well as the *Pitney Bowes* case, there they were looking for a high level of control or integration. There's not that high level of control or integration and the company doesn't share employees or share documents in the ordinary course.

Now, counsel has talked about financial reporting. That's separate from this test, Your Honor. The fact that subsidiaries provide financial reporting to the holding company that then puts it in its 10K doesn't mean that there's a sharing of documents and surely not the sharing of documents in the ordinary course as it relates to Chinese

drywall.

It's also important to recognize, we believe Your Honor, that Chase & Co. is not a party to this litigation. A moment ago, counsel referred to some orders everybody was familiar with as it relates to Taishan. Well, your Honor, it may be familiar to the parties in the litigation, but it's not familiar to us because we are not a party to this litigation. We were just invited, and we don't want to be here. We also are not going to gain anything from being here, Your Honor, which is another one of those factors.

Counsel has also relied in his brief about the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relation Law. Your Honor, that's not applicable. Chase has not asserted that it cannot produce these documents because it would violate some court's sovereignty or their laws. That's not at issue here.

The third point I wanted to make to Your Honor was there is a way for you to be able to provide this information or at least the PSC to obtain this information. In August of 2011, PSC counsel received a letter from in-house counsel at JPMorgan Chase & Co. listing the subsidiaries of JPMorgan Chase & Co. that at one time held some interest in CNBM. In other words, Your Honor, Chase & Co. provided a road map to the PSC about who owned what.

Now, counsel has said and provided to us for the first time a report of CNBM in which it says Chase & Co. is the

shareholder. Your Honor, the rules of the Hong Kong exchange, which is where that document is from, require reporting of all of the parents of anybody who owns stock in companies traded on the Hong Kong business exchange. So although that document lists Chase & Co. as the shareholder, it's actually the companies that we have provided to the PSC that have that ownership interest in CNBM. Of those 27 companies, 23 of those companies are based in the United States or in the United Kingdom.

Your Honor, I submit that the Court should require the PSC to serve the subpoenas on those companies. Those companies can be subpoenaed. We are not talking about companies that are in Taiwan or China that want to escape the jurisdiction of this Court. There are 23 of those 27 companies that the PSC can serve easily, and Chase & Co. is happy to provide assistance to the PSC in that regard.

What Chase & Co. wants is for the parties to:
One, follow the requirements of the laws as relates to Rule 45
and serve subpoenas properly; and, two, take into account the
corporate formalities that Chase & Co. has put into place with
the subpoenas and serve those companies that may have the
documents, not serve a parent that's then required to survey
thousands of companies to look for documents when we have
provided that information to the PSC. So that's why,
Your Honor, we ask for the motion for the subpoena to be

quashed and for the motion to compel be denied.

THE COURT: Okay. Any response to that?

MR. DAVIS: If I can clean up any confusion because I don't want to be misleading in any way. I don't know if JPMorgan Chase has documents or not, but it's only logical that if they're a major owner, they ought to be getting information. They clearly, like any stockholder or any lender, would do due diligence before it made an investment. That's only logical. But we don't know -- I concede that, Your Honor -- what documents exist.

With respect to the factors for control, as I said, Your Honor, if discovery is needed, we will do that. But as a practical matter, we ought to know whether or not we are fighting over documents or not or if we can agree on documents before we even get to that.

The PSC is looking to address the entities that hold themselves out as the owner as they do in their annual report and their 10K filings. Now, I understand counsel's belief that ownership in some other country may mean different than ownership as we appreciate it, but an owner is an owner is an owner is who they report to, their shareholders. So if, as I say, the children or the grandchildren have documents, we ought to be able to look to the parent and say, "Tell us what you have. Let us know. Get us the documents." If we have to go issue subpoenas to all of these other

20-some-odd or however many entities, we will be tied up forever. That's the practical approach.

Now, I understand that JPMorgan Chase believes that they haven't been part of this process in this litigation and that they're a third party, but all they need to do is look at the briefing that was filed in the prior matter that I spoke to and the order that came out of this Court. JPMorgan Chase is prominently displayed in exhibits, and I invite JPMorgan Chase and T. Rowe Price to look at those documents. They may not be a part right now in this litigation, but they certainly have been mentioned in filings with the Court. I don't know where this litigation will go.

Your Honor, I'm not going to go into the law, but it's cited in great detail in our brief. Again, I refer back to the *BAC* case, which says that the parent corporation has to respond for its children and grandchildren.

THE COURT: Does T. Rowe Price have anything?

MR. COE: Yes, Your Honor. This is Ward Coe for T. Rowe Price. Thank you for allowing me to participate by phone.

I'm not going to repeat what Mr. Ferachi has said, which is equally applicable to T. Rowe Price. I just wanted to make a couple of factual statements that I think are a distinction.

They are also a holding company. T. Rowe Price

Group has no documents responsive to the subpoena. It has no employee who is knowledgeable of the items in the 30(b)(6) notice except with respect to the overall structure of the corporation and its insurance.

T. Rowe Price Group has a subsidiary named
T. Rowe Price International which is an investment adviser, and
that subsidiary has a subsidiary named T. Rowe Price Hong Kong
which is also an investment adviser. It is located in Hong
Kong and it has an employee, Mr. Yi, Y-I, who we have
identified in our papers as someone who would be knowledgeable
about some of the items in the 30(b)(6) notice. We have also
identified T. Rowe Price Hong Kong as the entity that would
have documents responsive to some of the subpoena requests.

T. Rowe Price Group itself, we have represented, has made no investments in or loans to any of the entities involved in this litigation. Some T. Rowe Price funds, each of which are a separate corporate entry, have made investments on behalf of clients in CNBM. Our preliminary research indicates that it's considerably less than what the plaintiffs' steering committee has claimed, that it's around 1.6 percent of CNBM. The investor allegations which are in paragraphs 108 to 118 of the amended complaint simply could not be made with respect to T. Rowe Price Group or any of its entities.

The fact of the matter is what is being sought here are documents that are in the hands of a corporate sub-sub

on the other side of the world and knowledge which is in the knowledge of an employee there, and it's simply improper to require a holding company in Baltimore to collect all that information when it isn't a party to the lawsuit and when the factors that Mr. Ferachi pointed out are equally applicable to T. Rowe Price with respect to the analysis of whether the T. Rowe Price Group holding company controls those documents.

Your Honor, for that reason we have asked for the subpoena to be quashed. T. Rowe Price Group is not connected to this litigation, it's apparently burdensome to

the subpoena to be quashed. T. Rowe Price Group is not connected to this litigation, it's apparently burdensome to require it to do this work on behalf of the plaintiffs' steering committee, and for that reason we would request that the motion to quash be granted and the motion to compel be denied.

Additionally, if there is any portion of these documents which T. Rowe Price is required to produce, we believe that under Rule 45(c)(2)(B), the plaintiffs' steering committee would be required to compensate us for our costs in doing so. We understand that, as a practical matter, they want to control their costs, but there's absolutely no reason for a nonparty to have to make it up for them. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

Go ahead. You wanted to say something?

MR. FERACHI: Your Honor, just briefly, if I may.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. FERACHI: Counsel referred to the ATM litigation case. What I think is important to recognize, Your Honor, is that Bank of America's holding company was a party to that litigation. JPMorgan Chase & Co. is not a party to this litigation. The burden as it relates to a nonparty is higher than a party. While counsel said that JPMorgan Chase might be all over a number of documents, we are not aware of that, Your Honor. We haven't been involved in this litigation. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Let me make just a couple of comments. First, counsel for plaintiff mentions that parents always control their kids and grandparents control their kids. I'm not quite sure that's accurate in all instances. I think it depends on the relationship and a couple of other things.

Let me make some comments. I'll write something on it but just by sketching it out, you will have my views. Numerous courts have unquestionably held a parent corporation that has sufficient degree of ownership and control over a subsidiary is, of course, deemed to have control over the documents in the possession of that subsidiary. The issue really is what is the "sufficient degree" of control and ownership.

The burden is on the person who is requesting the information to establish that matter. There's also no

question that for a wholly-owned subsidiary, the parent, generally speaking, has been deemed to have control. They wholly own it. They have control.

There are also some cases where even when it's approaching the 50 percent level but not over the 50 percent level, the courts have held that there's not sufficient control. 43.8 percent in the *Hubbard* case comes to mind, where they said that they did not have sufficient control to satisfy the sufficient degree of control requirement and they refused to do it.

In the present case, I really think we are dealing with two stages here. The first stage, the PSC, as the requesting party, must show sufficient ownership, sufficient control over the subsidiaries. Unless you can agree on it among yourselves or between yourselves, discovery may be required to show that.

Things like corporate structure, interlocutory boards, ownership interest, history and practice of sharing documents, board membership, office space, advertisement, public relations, lobbyists, things of that sort, if they are one and the same or the parent supplies all of that information, that could be significant. History of sharing employees, that's always looked at.

Business relationship involving the product in question. If there's a subsidiary who sells eggs, this might

not be sufficient to have to go into the discovery of that particular issue.

Commonality of ownership. When I looked at the last issues before me in discovery, I noticed that they had interlocutory boards. Some people were on both boards. They had such a close relationship that I felt that it was one and the same; or if not one and the same, technically speaking, the sufficient control was there.

If the PSC does some 30(b)(6) discovery of people who know the answers to those questions and if they establish that sufficient control of all or some of the subsidiaries, then I think the second stage has to be looked at. The existence of documents, the cost of producing the documents, the relevance of the documents, the burdensomeness of producing the documents and who pays for it, I think those are issues, but they are issues that come to the second stage and not the first stage.

I was hoping that you all could agree on some of the first stage to cut out some of the cost involved, but it's apparent that you don't agree to it. I don't see that the PSC has established enough to show that there is sufficient control. I'll flesh it out a little bit more so that you all have my thinking in a little better structure, but for those reasons I'm going to deny the motions of the PSC and grant the motions of the defendant at this point.

I reserve the right for the PSC to take some
discovery to deal with the question of control.
Interrogatories just doesn't cut it, frankly. You're not going
to be able to establish much from that. That's one lawyer
talking to another lawyer and it just doesn't work. 30(b)(6)
is probably where you need to go, but you ought to take some
30(b)(6) of the people who know about the corporate structure,
interlocutory boards, ownership interest, history and practice
of sharing documents, employees, and other things. Then if you
have established that point and there's enough sufficient
control of the subsidiaries, I think the law is going to be
clear and that those documents need to be produced.
Thank you very much. Court will stand in
recess. Thank you on the phone.
THE DEPUTY CLERK: All rise.
(WHEREUPON the Court was in recess.)
* * *
<u>CERTIFICATE</u>
I, Toni Doyle Tusa, CCR, FCRR, Official Court Reporter for the United States District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript, to the best of my ability and understanding, from the record of the proceedings in the above-entitled and numbered matter.
<u>s/ Toni Doyle Tusa</u> Toni Doyle Tusa, CCR, FCRR Official Court Reporter