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1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
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5	IN RE: CHINESE-MANUFACTURED DRYWALL PRODUCTS
6	LIABILITY LITIGATION
7	CIVIL DOCKET NO. 09-MD-2047 "L" NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA
09:02:40 8	THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 2018, 9:00 A.M.
9	THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO
10	ALL CASES
11	*******************
12	TRANSCRIPT OF STATUS CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS
13	HEARD BEFORE THE HONORABLE ELDON E. FALLON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 2018 MORNING SESSION (COURT CALLED TO ORDER)

THE COURT: Okay. We have two motions today. The first motion has to do with the plaintiffs' motion to certify a ruling of the court.

The Court two and a half years ago ruled on a matter and granted dismissal in a particular case. plaintiffs now seek to have a certification at the Fifth Circuit so they can appeal that particular issue.

I'll hear from the movants. Go ahead.

LONGER: Good morning, Your Honor. Fred Longer on MR. behalf of the plaintiffs. I've asked Mr. Oser to set up the Elmo, which I intend to use.

Just as preliminary matters, Pearl Robertson is also going to join me in this argument. We're going to split this argument up a little bit. She's going to address some of the factual matters that we think are pertinent, and I'll follow through afterwards and address some of the legal matters that we think are pertinent.

> THE COURT: Okay.

MS. ROBERTSON: Good morning. May it please the Court,

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09:11:06 1 Pearl Robertson on behalf of plaintiffs.

I will open today argument with an explanation of how we got here. We should address the issues of timeliness that may be of the Court's concern. Following this brief outline of the circumstances that brought us here today, Fred Longer will resume the PSC's argument to justify certification.

Without belaboring the points in our briefs, I will quickly explain why the time is ripe for the PSC's motion to certify Your Honor's March 10, 2016, Orders and Reasons.

First, there is no time line for request for certification. 28 U.S.C. § 1293(b) contains no time limit for filing a request for certification. In fact, logic and judicial efficiency supports certification of the March 10, 2016, order for immediate review just as this court has done for the other jurisdictional rulings.

Second, plaintiffs' recent discovery of translation -- recent discovery and translation of documents provide additional proof that there is separation between the Chinese state and CNBM Group and that CNBM Group was involved in the commercial activities of its subsidiaries.

To offer additional context, on May 3, Your Honor entered an order regarding the January 2016 sanction order against Taishan for certain discovery abuses related to documents produced from Peng's computers and e-mails,

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As part of that order, the Court instructed the PSC to conduct its own relevancy review of Mr. Peng's computer and e-mails. Thereafter, the PSC would advise Taishan of relevant documents discovered and request manual translation of those documents, all to comply with the Court's May 3rd order.

The PSC and Taishan engaged in this process amicably, but return of manual translations takes between 30 and 35 days. So, upon discovery of documents that appear to speak to the indirect ownership of PSC over CNBM Group and documents that were suggestive of commercial activity by CNBM, the PSC opted to expedite the translations and ask their translator Yan Gao to translate those documents the PSC determined relevant to the FSIA issues. Shortly thereafter, we filed our motion for certification.

To be clear, the documents attached to the PSC's certification briefing result from the PSC's relevancy review of Peng's documents and e-mails. Further, the PSC conducted additional due diligence and used search phrases from the machine translation of these documents to discover whether CNBM Group produced the documents in 2015. The PSC was unable to match any such documentation in the CNBM group documents.

THE COURT: Why don't you focus, though, on facts in that situation. In my opinion, I didn't see any evidence adverse to the fact that the CNBM Group was wholly owned by the

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People's Republic of China. There was nothing there and I made the decision, but it was factual based decision. The appeal, you're talking about appealing now, it's generally 1292 is issues of law that are significant. You're focused on issues of fact. Is that a 1292 appeal?

MS. ROBERTSON: Your Honor, what we feel is that the documents show that the facts that are discovered in these newly translated documents support the controlling question of law of whether there is direct ownership by the PRC. Some of the documents attached we feel show that CNBM Group is reporting up the line, but they are not reporting up the line to the PRC. They are reporting up the line to different governmental entities that's showing a separation between CNBM Group and the People's Republic of China.

As Mr. Longer will explain, we believe *Dole Foods* is wholly applicable to the argument and certification for 1292 as *Dole Food* definitely stands for the fact that indirect ownership, any indirectness there, absolutely -- is absolutely fatal to defendant's argument that foreign sovereign immunity applies.

On that point, Your Honor, as displayed in our brief, the first brief, 21533-1, at page 8 that Mr. Longer will discuss further with you, CNBM Group itself acknowledges that it is 100 percent owned by SASAC. SASAC is not the PRC and PRC is not SASAC; therefore, our argument remains that there is

separation between CNBM Group and the Chinese foreign state itself.

It seems as though, Your Honor, perhaps

Mr. Longer should now address some of the other issues of law
unless you have any further issues questions regarding
documents or timeliness.

THE COURT: No, I'll hear from him.

MR. LONGER: So, good morning, again. Fred Longer.

So, to your point, Your Honor, everyone here is familiar with Section 1292(b). There are three elements that we have to require -- meet, satisfy, and I think we've easily satisfied all of them of.

The concern that Your Honor raised about whether there is a controlling question of law is something that the defendants raised. We think it's very clear that whether the PRC directly owns a majority of shares of CNBM Group is a controlling question of law, if there are facts that support it, but that is coming directly from the *Dole Food* case, which is the United States Supreme Court, and the United States Supreme Court has told us that there cannot be an intermediary based on the precise language of the FSIA.

So, there are a number of points that, I guess, I want to start with. So, as to a controlling question of law, whether there has been an incorrect disposition that would require reversal of a final judgment is recognized to be a

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So even though there are facts involved in this decision, any personal jurisdiction opinion, Your Honor, is going to involve questions of fact. So, it's whether the marriage of fact to law is worth going up on appeal right away. That's basically the big picture that's at issue here.

Your Honor, as you've just heard from my colleague, has heard, and we know, that for the April 21, 2017, order of personal jurisdiction regarding the other Taishan defendants in the CNBM and BNBM entities, Your Honor certified that question. You said it made sense to go up right now and that an immediate appeal would certainly help the ultimate termination of the litigation.

All of the same reasoning that was rendered in that opinion applies here.

THE COURT: I don't have any objection to that. You know my feeling on these matters, and I treat the MDL's differently than I do the individual case. It seems to me that seminal issues, gateway issues -- preemption, jurisdiction, things of that sort, immunity -- really, if I can decide that as quickly as I can, it's helpful to the litigation because you don't have to spend a ton of money to get where you're going and then all of a sudden find out that you're in the wrong place and it was all for naught.

So I do try to focus on those. I think that

issue is a significant one, but the issue of timeliness is giving me a little difficulty.

MR. LONGER: I want to get to that.

MR. LONGER: Let me take it on right now, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Why is it two and a half years late?

So there is a number of things that happened. First of all, the FSIA ruling originally from March 10, 2016, was not a final order. Everyone recognizes that there were other defendants. The PSC was of the mind-set we didn't agree with Your Honor's ruling -- we still don't agree with Your Honor's ruling -- but because there were other defendants in the litigation, it's not a final order; we can't take an appeal right now.

As time has gone by, we knew that the other defendants were moving for dismissal under Rule 12. Your Honor ruled. That was April of 2017. They sought to take the immediate appeal. Your Honor certified that question. That was a trigger point.

Right after that or at that time the

Supreme Court came out with Animal Science, which said that you can't take the word of a Chinese entity, the say-so of a

Chinese entity. In that case it was the Chinese government who came in and said, hey, we do regulate the rates of the defendant's pricing and you should take our word for it. The Supreme Court goes, well, that's very nice, but we're only

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going to give you deferential respect.

That, the immediately certification of the other appeal, the Fifth Circuit has jurisdiction in front of it, Your Honor. We're getting new documents, as Ms. Robertson just mentioned. Everything is pointing to the fact that there are new indicia that support an immediate appeal now.

As a practical matter, it makes sense that if the Fifth Circuit is going to deal with the jurisdiction of the underlings, it may have -- it may as well take jurisdiction over the overling and that would be CNBM Group. So that's the argument on that score.

I want to go back to the statute itself. I have on the board here, this is on the Elmo, this is coming right out of the *Dole Food* case. It talks about Section 1603 of the FSIA, and it says that, you know, the definition of an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state is any entity which is a separate legal person, corporate, or otherwise, and — and this is a disjunctive — which is an organ of a foreign state or a political subdivision thereof or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof.

As we know from *Dole Food*, that the ultimate holding in the case was only direct ownership of a majority of shares by the foreign state satisfies the regulatory requirement. That's the United States Supreme Court.

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So, in terms of majority ownership, Your Honor expressed a finding just a moment ago that there was no evidence, but at the hearing that took place on the FSIA argument, we presented this slide.

It was argued that in the BNBM PLC annual reports, there were ten of them listed here, Your Honor.

That's in the legend below, Exhibits 3, 8, 10, 12, 15, 29, 21, 18, 20, and 23. There were ten annual reports which were filed under the Shenzhen Stock Exchange rules.

Mr. Cao, who is an officer of BNBM at CNBM Group, declared under penalties of whatever perjury is over in China, that the following was accurate and truthful. What the annual reports said under Mr. Cao's signature and declaration thereof is that SASAC, the State-Owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, owned CNBM Materials Group Corporation 100 percent. Ten times he said that.

He gives two times, Your Honor -- this is also a slide that we presented at that hearing. Twice Your Honor has ruled that SASAC owns 100 percent of CNBM Group. One is the *Germano* findings of fact; the other is the class certification findings of fact.

After that we have one declaration of Mr. Cao, where he says forget everything that I've said in the annual reports. I guess -- he didn't say he was lying then, but he

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must have said I am mistaken or I'm exaggerating the truth then or whatever the words that will come out of his mouth. He gives another declaration as says just the opposite.

CNBM Group is owned by the People's Republic of China.

There is a real dispute there, Your Honor, but it does come down — there is evidence supporting our position.

There was evidence presented at the hearing. We recognize that Your Honor found otherwise, but irrespective of the support, the evidentiary support, it creates a mixed question of law which is supported by fact, and it is this the ultimate question that Dole Food presents, which is is there an intermediary in between the foreign sovereign and the defendant such that there is not or that there is indirect ownership.

We have proven that there is not direct ownership. That is the controlling question of law which we would like to have certified to the Circuit court so that we can get to bottom of it because we think that Your Honor's ruling, based on one declaration of Mr. Cao, which is controverted by Mr. Cao, is worthy of appellate review.

We also presented the opinion of our expert,

Curtis Milhaupt, and Professor Milhaupt, who is knowledgeable

about state-owned enterprises and Chinese corporate structure

has opined, in essence, that things are not what they seem in

China. You can't make direct parallels to our experience here

in the United States with the corporate structures that exist

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in China. A lot of that has to do with the Communist Party being involved in all of these entities.

So, we think that what I just described provides quite a substantial grounds for difference of opinion. In fact, Your Honor has two opinions that support exactly what we're saying. Now we have one opinion against it. So, you, yourself, Your Honor, have a substantial ground for difference of opinion here.

Then, finally, we think --

THE COURT: Give me a time, though, Fred. That's the point. I got it. I understand the mixed question of fact. That may have carried the day clearly soon thereafter. What's the reason for the delay for two and a half years?

MR. LONGER: So I return to where I was.

THE COURT: Yep.

MR. LONGER: Section 1292 has no timeline. There is no prohibition. The defendants have cited to no controlling authority to suggest that there must be an immediacy to the request for the 1292(b).

THE COURT: There is no statutory restriction about that.

MR. LONGER: (Speaking simultaneously) There is no statutory restriction; there is no Circuit restriction. The best they have is the *Aparicio* case. I may be mispronouncing it. It was a Sieracki seaman case, Your Honor. I'm going to

take you back a long way to the Longshoreman's Act.

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In that case, the Fifth Circuit -- that's a Fifth Circuit case -- the Fifth Circuit simply said it was actually okay to a year later recertify -- I'm sorry, to issue a second opinion and then recertify from the second opinion, a year later, and take that one up on appeal, and they said that they had appellate jurisdiction.

So timeliness is not at issue. They want to make it an issue. I get it. There is a Seventh Circuit opinion that they are harping on, and there is, I'm sure, other out-of-Fifth-Circuit opinions, but there is no controlling authority that is here.

The timeliness of the 1292(b) motion should only be a concern where nothing has changed since the ruling, but much has changed here. We have Your Honor's opinion on the BNBM and CNBM Group. We have new authority coming out of the United States Supreme Court, the Animal Science opinion. As Ms. Robertson has explained, we have new documents which confirm the facts that were already of record way back when.

So, all of those, the constellation of all of those matters, Your Honor, make this more than timely.

Timeliness is not the issue here. It's really a practical question. Your Honor, does it -- is this the type of threshold gateway issue that Your Honor described that belongs up at the Circuit court because, at the end of the day, we're going to

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have to take an appeal, and CNBM Group should come back in.

Why not know now? It's just a practical question. The only answer to that is if you've got the other ones going up, we acknowledge that they are not going to be consolidated, they will be separate appeals, but why not have it all go up at once?

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I got it. Thank you.

If anybody is on the phone, please don't discuss the matters on the phone. Just listen to what's being held.

MR. STENGEL: James Stengel, S-T-E-N-G-E-L, for CNBM Group.

All right. Let's go to the first substantive page. Your Honor, there are four requirements for certification under 1292(b). None of them have been met here. What the PSC argued this morning was useful in clarifying the reality of what's happened.

A tactile decision was made to avoid an immediate appeal at the time Your Honor rendered this opinion two and a half years ago. Subsequent events have unfolded, and there has been buyer's remorse about not having sought an appeal.

Each of these requirements has to be met, and Your Honor appropriately focused on timeliness because this is two and a half years after the decision. What I think this morning clarified was despite the recitals of Peng, there was

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no new evidence which is relevant to the issues in this matter.

What you saw were exhibits which were put before you in late 2015, early 2016. That was before this court. What they are saying is we don't like the way you came out. You made a mistake. There is no justification and, Mr. Longer is correct, there is no rule which specifies a 10-day period, there is no statute which does that, but as Your Honor is aware there is a substantial body of district court opinion and Circuit court opinion doing something quite reasonable, which is imposing time limits on when a party makes a decision on whether they are going to seek certification.

I would contrast the PSC's behavior with that of ours where we made an immediate application to this court where it was appropriate, which, I should note, was vociferously opposed by the PSC, but we recognized what the 1292(b) talks about is immediate appeal. It's hard to square two and a half years with an immediate appeal.

The other point I think we all ought to have in mind here is there was an assertion about, well, if you took the BNBM and CNBM personal jurisdiction matters and they are now certified they are before the Circuit, and while we can't argue them together, we might as well get everything up there at once.

We're talking about substantially different legal questions. This is a matter of subject matter jurisdiction for

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reservins. This is a matter of suc

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the Court because of sovereign immunity. Those are personal jurisdiction arguments as to BNBM and CNBM. It involves application of state law. Now, we can debate as to whether we think that's appropriate or not, but there is no real overlap in terms of what's at issue.

What's happened here is two and a half years have passed where CNBM Group is now part of litigation. Now because, I think, of the certification more than anything else, the PSC wants to revisit the issue.

As Your Honor identified, and it's somewhat disingenuous to say there is no law in this because there are cases in that discuss what's timely under 1292(b), and one year is the absolute outside. There are cases discussing whether three months is too late because of the need to have cases proceed in an orderly fashion before the courts, and obviously it's disruptive to have a lengthy delay before cases are taken up.

THE COURT: They say there is no harm doing it. If it comes late, it comes late, but the main thing is justice be done. They say that you're up there now, you might as well have the whole loaf. What's your feeling there?

MR. STENGEL: Well, a couple of responses to that,
Your Honor. First of all, it's their burden on this motion.
They need to show where the justice resides.

The other is -- and we need to be careful about

this, and Your Honor and I have talked about this in prior appearances -- we are not before the Fifth Circuit, meaning CNBM Group. These are distinct entities and you're talking about taking a different corporation up to Circuit.

Different CNBM and BNBM entities are there, but, again, since they are going to proceed on a separate schedule -- I mean, we're on the cusp of getting a briefing schedule as to the personal jurisdiction matters. This matter would, of necessity, since we would have to go to the Circuit, litigate the issue of certification, and only if they were successful at that point proceed, these are not going to be connected in time.

Again, I think the justice point is really the -- and I won't use the technical phrase of estoppel, but the PSC made a decision. They didn't like your outcome on sovereign immunity. They presented evidence, factual matter that Your Honor did not think that was adequate, and it is not for a variety of reasons we can talk about, but now to come back after two and a half years, with all this litigation, with, I think, 1,500 docket entries -- we have been busy. Lots has happened.

It's one thing for a party who has been dismissed to bear the risk that at the end of a case there may be a final appeal with a final judgment, and there may be some risk a reversal, but it's quite different to say one party can lie in

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the weeds, and at their decision bring a party back in to the litigation. That's unfair and it's unjustified as a matter of law.

We can talk about justice, but if we look at the requirements of the statute, what we'll see is they come nowhere close to meeting their obligation as movants under 1292(b) to seek certification of this court.

They don't like what Your Honor decided, and I understand that. I suspect Your Honor understands that, but the fact that they don't like the outcome, they want to take a different view now, doesn't justify reopening the situation in a grossly untimely fashion, particularly when, on the merits, if we were only arguing timeliness, I believe we still prevail. But when you fold in the failure to comply with the other requirements of the statute, this becomes a frolic and detour, and it's really not a matter of justice when they can't support a reason for certification here.

THE COURT: Let me ask you this just as a practical matter in these types of cases. When it's over in a sense that one side wins or the other side loses, if the plaintiffs lose, don't they take an appeal at that time? Then this issue is before either the Fifth Circuit or some court two, three, four five years from now, and if they prevail, aren't you then back in it?

MR. STENGEL: Well, Your Honor, everything having only

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been doing this for 40 years I hesitate to tell Your Honor how litigation works, but it seems to me that this is a speculative enterprise. We have come close to resolving this litigation. The odds are substantial there won't be appeals. We just don't

One of the reasons for the structure of 1292(b) is the idea that you are entitled to some level of intermediate finality during litigation. The statute, as Your Honor is well aware, places fairly high burdens on movants to achieve certification. We think in our case we met those and Your Honor agreed. In this case, again, they fail at every

Now, the issues are, to some extent, different in an MDL than in a one-off case. I take the point well with the timeliness in a one-off case. My concern about this from the standpoint of an MDL is that it just keeps it alive forever because they have a continuing opportunity to appeal. You may win the case and then five years down the road win the case, and then they take the appeal and you're back in it again.

It seems to me that somewhere along the line if you can find some finality before. This case is 23,000 people, plaintiffs, a thousand defendants. To keep it alive for 15, 20 years, it's not good for the litigants; it's not good for the system. I'm trying to grapple with that issue.

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MR. STENGEL: Well, Your Honor, the problem with that -- and I come from New York where, in our state system, everything is immediately appealable and it's a nightmare.

THE COURT: Right. We have that too.

MR. STENGEL: I'm not suggesting the federal courts do that, but the federal courts have made a decision that, by and large, they are not interlocutory appeals, and the system works that way. That's why 1292(b), excuse me, Your Honor is a restrictive provision.

You could envision an alternative universe where like, in the New York Supreme Court, everything is appealed.

THE COURT: We have that in Louisiana.

MR. STENGEL: I would suggest, Your Honor -- and Your Honor has spent more time in MDLs than I have certainly, but it would be a nightmarish outcome if everything were immediately appealable in matters of this complexity. So there is a reason why the hurdle that 1292(b) imposes is a very high one.

THE COURT: I agree. Both of these issues, your issues -- that's the reason I 1292'd those because, to me, it's a key issue. It's a seminal issue. Jurisdiction is significant. This is also jurisdiction. That's an area that I'm grappling with is just whether we deal with it differently in an MDL as opposed to a one-off case.

MR. STENGEL: Well, Your Honor, I don't think there is

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a reason to deal with it differently because the proof provided by the PSC in 2015 and 2016 was found by this court by Your Honor to be wanting on the issues presented.

The rational for them coming back now, and I think there was clarity provided in Mr. Longer's argument, that this really isn't a matter of new evidence which goes to the points which are critical to your decision. They are saying here is what we gave you in early 2016 and, boy, did you get it wrong. That's not what 1292(b) is all about.

Now, the explanation they provide is we have new evidence. Well, I think we can take that off the table because there is no new evidence relevant to the issue they are raising here today.

The other issue is a citation to the Supreme Court's case In *Animal Products*.

THE COURT: I see that.

MR. STENGEL: This is a completely different case. I will say, and I've raised this with Your Honor before, I think we do need to be careful. We're not going to revive the Chinese Exclusion Act in this courtroom. That's not what the Supreme Court said.

They didn't cast doubt about the Chinese government's statements, but as Your Honor knows that was a very different situation where the Chinese government had literally come in and said that this is our rule as to pricing

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of vitamin C.

The Second Circuit had said that's game, set, and match. If the Chinese government says that or if any government says it we're finished.

The Supreme Court said, no, it's certainly probative, but you're not bound by the statement of a governmental entity. In any event, since it's not relevant to your decision here, it's not a justification for their delay.

We've covered the issue of the fact that these appeals are not going to be together, so we're not talking about any particular savings, any utility.

The issue of controlling question of law is very important because that's really what's at issue here, and you heard, I think, with some clarity the objection is they don't like the way you assessed the application of facts to law here. They think, boy, you should have relied on the Shenzhen Exchange documents and ignored Mr. Cao's declaration.

The problem for that is that's typical argument in isolation because I think what we presented at the time, what Your Honor reacted to was its reasonably clear as a matter of Chinese law that the PRC, I mean these are called state-owned enterprises for a reason. They use SASAC because somebody has to administer the companies owned by the government, and there is really no contrary evidence of that. I think it's broadly accepted. There may have been some

imprecision in disclosure documents but, you know, nothing that brings us, you know, to a different result.

Two points I make. One I hesitate to make but I think I really have to. This issue of SASAC ownership, and we heard an eminent counsel only an hour ago talk about the fact that you couldn't raise new matters in reply, so there is a substantial question of waiver here.

But beyond that, and I would like spend just a moment on Dole Foods because it's not applicable in this situation because what's being read out is the ownership can be either directly by the state or by a political subdivision. We think worst case, if you looked at SASAC rationally, it's a political subdivision of the PRC, you come to the same result one way or the other. Dole Foods doesn't run contrary to that.

If we were going to be an equivalent role to Dole Foods, what we would be doing is we would have come in and said, Taishan, BNBM, the whole corporate chain is immune because they are all owned ultimately and controlled by CNBM Group and, by extension, the PRC.

That wasn't the argument we made. We were reasoned in our request that sovereign immunity apply. We read the statute. We read the cases and said, we think this is clearly applicable to CNBM Group, but we can't stretch it further down, but that issue of ownership is really a red herring in this context.

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So, with that, Your Honor, unless you have questions....

THE COURT: No. I'm fine.

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MR. STENGEL: Thank you very much.

THE COURT: Thank you very much. I appreciate, Jim.

Any rebuttal? Fred?

MR. LONGER: There is no buyer's remorse here,
Your Honor. As Mr. Stengel mentioned, we have been busy. A
lot has happened since Your Honor's ruling. In fact,
Your Honor's ruling setup an avenue, if you will, where we
began settlement discussions. Those settlement discussions
fail. Then Your Honor ruled on the BNBM/CNBM motions to
dismiss, and then Your Honor certified that for an immediate
appeal. The straggler was the FSIA ruling, which was not the
straggler, was the seminal opinion. We're saying let's bring
that back, have it all go up.

Now is the time. If not now, when? What they are saying, and I heard Your Honor saying this, you're going to -- we have been delaying and delaying and delaying. It's not we. The defendants' strategy from the moment their counsel went over to China to meet with their clients is we will delay these proceedings ad infinitum. We are almost a decade into this litigation, and they still want to delay the appeal of a fundamental jurisdictional question. Is this defendant properly in the United States federal system or not? They want

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to keep delaying that.

The reality is that a 54(b) judgment could be entered, Your Honor, and we'll just go up on a direct appeal. So why not have it now, certify the matter, and as a practical matter, the Fifth Circuit will resolve all of these questions, and the delay can be avoided?

THE COURT: What do you gain by it, Fred, if you're got jurisdiction over the other part of the alphabet but not the group?

MR. LONGER: We have all of the direction and control that originated at the very top. All of the documents that we have presented, as Ms. Robertson was talking about, all of those documents are more than relevant. They are absolutely relevant.

They show that this was a deliberate act on the defendants' part, all the way to the corporate parent, which is CNBM Group. CNBM Group should have -- be heard here in the court. It should not avoid jurisdiction when there is an intermediary owner, the SASAC, in between it and the PRC, and we think that is a fundamental question which needs to be resolved at the Circuit.

THE COURT: Okay. I got it. I understand.

MR. STENGEL: Your Honor, there is something I have to respond to, which there is this process of conflating what's at issue in terms of control. The record in this court is devoid

09:50:58 1	of any indication that CNBM Group had any contact, awareness,	
09:51:03 2	or involvement in the sale of allegedly defective drywall in	
09:51:08 3	the United States, full stop.	
09:51:10 4	There may be issues which we think the PSC	
09:51:14 5	misinterprets as to the conduct of the litigation years later.	
09:51:19 6	When we start talking about the tort exception or the , those	
09:51:27 7	would require affirmative proof by the PSC to meet the burden	
09:51:30 8	that there was involvement by group in the sale of drywall.	
09:51:34 9	After 10 years, there is no evidence in this record.	
09:51:36 10	Thank you, Your Honor.	
09:51:37 11	THE COURT: Okay. I got it. Okay. I'll take that	
09:51:41 12	under advisement.	
09:51:42 13	Let's to go the next issue.	
09:51:44 14	MR. LONGER: Thank you, Your Honor.	
09:51:45 15 THE COURT: Thanks, Fred.		
16	^ MOTION 2	
17	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
18	EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA	
19		
20	*****************	
21	IN RE: CHINESE-MANUFACTURED DRYWALL PRODUCTS	
22	LIABILITY LITIGATION	
23	CIVIL DOCKET NO. 09-MD-2047 "L" NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA	
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1	REF: 11-1395 and 11-1673
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4	TRANSCRIPT OF STATUS CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS HEARD BEFORE THE HONORABLE ELDON E. FALLON
5	UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
6	
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THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 2018

MORNING SESSION

(COURT CALLED TO ORDER)

THE COURT: The motion to stay, plaintiffs' motion to stay. These class actions were filed in this court. There is also the same class action filed in Virginia, and the same class action filed in Florida. The Court has now sent the Florida cases back.

The question is what do we do with those Florida cases that appear in this court? Do we stay those actions and allow Florida to go on or do we dismiss those actions so that Florida can go on?

MS. SCHWAB: Good morning, Your Honor. Emma Schwab for plaintiffs.

May it please the Court, plaintiffs are here today on a motion to stay the Florida clams that are included in the Louisiana Amorin complaint before this court because these claims are proceeding in Florida. We have also filed a motion to stay the nonFlorida claims in the Southern District of Florida in front of Judge Cooke. That motion is pending.

While CNBM and BNBM argue for dismissal without prejudice, Taishan is silent. Taishan's motion is silent as to

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whether they are requesting dismissal with or without prejudice.

Regardless of whether it is with or without, dismissal is not proper.

THE COURT: What are you concerned about?

MS. SCHWAB: These complaints were filed as protective measures for jurisdictional defenses, statute of limitation defenses, and we would like to keep the balance at play here.

We think that these -- that other states would have to independently prove jurisdiction without the significant port such as Florida, Louisiana, and Virginia. We think that the protective measures of keeping the claims in the MDL, not asking Your Honor to deal with them substantively but just keeping them here, would help and would alleviate any issues down the road.

THE COURT: In which way? Meaning since I've ruled on jurisdiction here, that they did business in Florida, jurisdictionally, since I found that, that if I dismiss them here, you'll be adversely affected in some way in Florida?

MS. SCHWAB: Yes, Your Honor. That's precisely what we're arguing.

Defendants have challenged jurisdiction every step of the way. If history is any indication, they will stop at nothing, and they will continue to challenge jurisdiction.

We think that without having the cases here with

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some kind of connexity to the MDL and some kind of connection to the significant ports, that it will prejudice plaintiffs, while a stay of the Florida cases on the MDL docket will have no impact whatever on defendants.

THE COURT: All right.

MS. SCHWAB: So, Your Honor, as I was saying, that defendants have challenged jurisdiction every step of the way. That is no question. Defendants will never concede jurisdiction. I think that we can all agree on that, which is all the more reason why the cases should be stayed.

Defendants continually blame the plaintiffs for the procedural mess, which is the three Amorin complaints, but it was their repeated misrepresentations and devious conduct which put us in the situation and provoked the need to file the protective actions in the first place.

If the Florida cases are dismissed, this court will likely apply the same ruling for other cases that are remanded in the future, and all nonFlorida, nonLouisiana, and nonVirginia claims would essentially have to prove jurisdiction independently of those significant ports once those Amorin complaints are remanded out of the MDL.

This would defeat the entire purpose of filing the protective actions to proactively address potential venue-specific personal jurisdiction and statute-of-limitation defenses.

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A stay will have -- and I was saying earlier, a stay will have the identical impact on defendants as a dismissal, so it cannot be argued that they would suffer any prejudice if the Florida Amorin claims are stayed, but a dismissal would negligently impact the rights of the Florida claimants without any corresponding benefit to this court and the plaintiffs.

A stay will not require defendants to engage in any discovery or motion practice in this court regarding these plaintiffs. The Florida claims will substantively be removed from the Court's management docket.

The Amorin complaints were filed as a protective action, and plaintiffs simply want to keep the balance in play. So, we respectfully request this court to exercise its jurisdiction and stay the Florida Amorin claims and any other prospective claims that are remanded out of the MDL while those claims run their course in other jurisdictions.

THE COURT: What's the disadvantage of staying it? Why not stay it? How are you hurt that way?

MS. EIKHOFF: It is clear that you can stay or you can dismiss. Fifth Circuit law is absolutely clear on that, so it is well within the Court's discretion to make this decision.

THE COURT: What do you get out of dismissal that you don't have out of stay?

MS. EIKHOFF: That eliminates the risk of inconsistent

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outcomes. It also cleans up these cases and provides more simplicity and more clarity as to where these cases are being adjudicated.

We're talking about only the Florida claims here. Those are before Judge Cooke. They are identical to the claims that are sitting here in this court that the PSC is asking to stay.

It is entirely unclear to us what the PSC means when they say they want to keep them alive as a protective measure, and I believe that Ms. Schwab just said to keep the balance in play. I don't know what that means.

THE COURT: I think what she's saying is that there is an argument that it's the law of case. If I decided jurisdiction, they can argue that Judge Cooke doesn't have to deal with jurisdiction because the law of the case is that I've already decided the jurisdiction.

MS. EIKHOFF: But that's true, Your Honor, we're not talking about the cases in front of Judge Cooke. We're not asking you to dismiss Judge Cook's cases. We're asking you to dismiss from the entirely identical duplicative Louisiana action the cases that Judge Cooke is actively adjudicating with jurisdiction that Taishan is not contesting.

So we don't understand why they want to keep these alive, to hold them on ice as, a quote, protective measure. We can only speculate that they want to keep them

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alive so that they can revive them at some point down the road if they don't like what Judge Cooke does.

Many federal courts, Your Honor, have said that's improper. You don't keep duplicative claims on ice in another court to hedge your bets or to keep the balance in play while another federal court is actively adjudicating them with jurisdiction.

Now, what I want to remind the Court that this is oral argument on the PSC's motion to stay, which is document Number 21639, but there are competing motions here, Your Honor, because Taishan did move to dismiss is the same claims, and that's Document Number 21729.

Your Honor, we hear it every month. We see it in every brief. They accuse us of delay, delay, delay, but here, we're trying to reach resolution, finality, simplicity, clean up these dockets. Judge Cooke has got the Florida claims. We are going forward on a discovery schedule and a full scheduling order that will get these cases to trial within the year.

So what we're trying to do is trying to avoid the delay of having lingering identical claims hanging out for some mysterious protective purposes, and that's why we believe it's appropriate to dismiss these claims, and I must make clear, without prejudice.

Your Honor, the PSC's brief said that the defendants are seeking to dismiss with prejudice. That is not

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reflected in anything that we've filed, and that is, in fact, not what we are doing.

THE COURT: Okay. I got it. I understand.

Any rebuttal.

MS. SCHWAB: Yes, Your Honor, very briefly.

Ms. Eikhoff mentioned that she was or that

Taishan was worried about inconsistent outcomes, and that's the
reason why the cases should be dismissed rather than stay. As

I stated earlier, we are not seeking -- we are not asking this
court to revisit this case at a later date or in the future,
and that is not what our intention is.

They also -- Ms. Eikhoff also mentioned that Taishan is not contesting jurisdiction, which I believe that is -- that we disagree with as, just whenever Bristol-Myers came out, they were very quick to file another challenge to Your Honor's jurisdictional rulings.

She also mentioned that they are trying to avoid delay and clean up the docket, but, yet, they are trying to unravel and start from scratch in the Florida proceedings.

So, I believe that in order to keep this all in line and to keep the balance at play that these cases should be stayed as opposed to dismissed.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. I got it.

One thing that I'm trying to do for you folks, both sides, I'm sending these cases back, but I'm sending them

back in waves so that I can keep involved in the case if you 10:03:09 1 need me for some reason, and that's comes into my thinking, 10:03:23 2 10:03:28 too. I've been with the case, been with you all now 10:03:29 4 for about a decade, and while I'm happy to send them out, I do 10:03:34 want to be available for you if you need me. I'm trying to 10:03:41 6 figure out how I can do that for you and at the same time not 7 10:03:44 have a lot of duplicity in the cases, and that's kind of a 10:03:49

challenge in these types of cases.

Frankly, it's a discussion point that a lot of my colleagues have. The opportunity to get rid of a case, get rid of the case immediately, and I can understand that. I feel if I could be of help to you all or be of service, I want to be able to do that, and I'm trying to figure out how to do that without having a problem.

I understand both sides of it. I'll take them under advisement, and I'll be coming out with a ruling shortly. Thank you very much.

> VOICES: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. HERMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.

May it please the Court, may Mr. Davis and I see you about a matter that has -- nothing to with drywall? discussed it with Harry.

> Harry, do you have any issue there? THE COURT: MR. ROSENBERG: I've discussed that matter with

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Mr. Herman and Mr. Davis, and we do not have an objection. 10:04:48 1 THE COURT: Okay. It's another case, as I understand. 10:04:54 10:04:57 3 I've got a couple of these. 4 (WHEREUPON, at 10:04 a.m., the proceedings were 5 concluded.) 6 7 8 9 10 11 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 12 13 I, Cathy Pepper, Certified Realtime Reporter, Registered 14 Merit Reporter, Certified Court Reporter in and for the State 15 of Louisiana, Official Court Reporter for the United States 16 District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, do hereby 17 certify that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript to 18 the best of my ability and understanding from the record of the 19 proceedings in the above-entitled and numbered matter. 20 21 s/Cathy Pepper 22 Cathy Pepper, CRR, RMR, CCR Certified Realtime Reporter 23 Registered Merit Reporter Official Court Reporter United States District Court 24 Cathy Pepper@laed.uscourts.gov

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